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HOUSING FINANCE IN HUNGARY:
SUBSIDIES AND THE 
SZECHENYI PLAN
Adam Kornfield
Introduction
Over the past century, Hungary’s housing
market has gone through many significant
changes. The country saw the rise and fall of
communism, which left a legacy of low quality
structures that continue to be a problem today.
In the 1980s the housing market was opened
up to private development, while the 1990s
brought a tremendous decline in the values of
bank loans for the purchase of housing. This
decline in lending caused the country’s hous-
ing prices to fall substantially. Then in 1998 the
housing market turned around as investors fled
the stock market after the Russian financial cri-
sis and began to buy real estate instead. 
In 2000 the Hungarian government insti-
tuted a generous housing subsidy package, the
Szechenyi Plan, which created a large increase
in lending. The government designed the pro-
gram to fix many of the problems that had
developed during the 1990s and the transition
from communism. While the program proved
very popular, it proved to be a strain on the gov-
ernment budget and was abandoned at the end
of 2003. 
In this article, I first present a brief histo-
ry of the housing environment in Hungary.
Then I examine the problems that the housing
market faced in 2000 and the Szechenyi Plan,
which was designed to address these problems.
I conclude by offering several recommenda-
tions for improving Hungary’s housing system.
A Brief History of Housing in
Hungary
Housing in Hungary has faced many sig-
nificant challenges and has undergone many
changes during the transition from commu-
nism. During the communist era, the state had
the responsibility for providing housing. While
the vast majority of Hungarians lived in state-
owned housing, only the wealthy few who lived
in rural areas owned a home. Hungarians gen-
erally lived in three primary types of homes:
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pre-World War II apartments, self-standing
homes, and high-rise suburban housing proj-
ects. The government built many high-rise sub-
urban housing projects due to their low cost
and rapid construction time. Unfortunately,
their poor construction led to inadequate insu-
lation and quick degradation, problems which
continue today. As with many of its other assets,
Hungary chose to privatize the vast majority of
state-owned housing in the early 1990s. In this
respect, Hungary served as a notable exception
to the other countries in the region by priva-
tizing 92 percent of formerly state-owned hous-
ing. (Szilagyi, p. 68) Compared to a rate of 48
percent in Poland and 42 percent in the Czech
Republic, Hungary had one of the highest home
ownership rates in Europe. (Markharn, p. 4;
Sykora) A tenant at the time of transition had
the option to purchase his home for roughly
one-quarter of its estimated market value.
Those living in the nicest apartments received
the best deals while those living in the 
run-down projects usually ended up saddled
with high maintenance costs and poor living
conditions.
While the new homeowners usually
received a bargain, a new set of problems
emerged shortly after transition as a result of
the mass privatization. Anyone who did not
occupy a home at the time of privatization faced
a difficult housing market. Rental units com-
prised a very low proportion of the housing
market, and loans to purchase a home offered
expensive and undesirable terms. The high
ownership rate created a market with relative-
ly few housing transactions. Home building also
fell sharply during the 1990s, with the number
of homes built dropping 64 percent from 1985
to 1998. (Hegedus and Varhegyi, p. 1636) It was
private citizens and their relatives who built the
majority of these homes, because for-profit
building companies were almost nonexistent.
(Hegedus and Zsamboki, p. 8) The market for
housing loans paralleled the decline of the con-
struction business. Debtors repaid old loans and
banks issued few new loans. The low level of
demand in the housing market created an envi-
ronment of decreasing prices. (Hegedus and
Varhegyi, p. 1636) Furthermore, soaring infla-
tion sent investors to other forms of invest-
ments; and they avoided the housing market,
where prices dropped almost in half from the
time of the transition to the late 1990s. 
The above problems were compounded by
the fact that the Hungarian banking system
remained largely noncompetitive throughout
the 1990s with the former state bank, OTP,
dominating the banking industry. (Diamond, 
p. 9) While two other large banks had begun
operations, they had failed to add a significant
competitive element to the market. Partly as a
result, Hungary has long suffered from high
mortgage interest rates. High interest rates
have often prevented those with average
incomes from being able to afford mortgages.
Then in 1998 the Russian financial crisis severe-
ly affected the Budapest Stock Exchange and
drove many investors back into the housing
market. While housing prices began to recover
from the wave of new investors, the country
entered the new millennium with an array of
housing problems that had not been success-
fully addressed during the prior decade.
Motivation for the Szechenyi Plan
One of the biggest problems has been the
inability of the average Hungarian to receive an
adequate housing loan to finance a substantial
portion of a home. While a person could bor-
row up to 15 percent of the value of a new
home, this left an enormous remainder to
finance. Typically someone selling his home and
purchasing a new home would have a large
amount of cash to pay the amount not covered
by the loan. However, those purchasing their
first home are in a very difficult position.
Typically a young person in Hungary will grad-
uate from secondary school or university and
live at home until marriage. After the wedding,
the two families can usually come up with
enough money to purchase a dwelling.
However, those without strong family support
are forced to find other less desirable housing
options, such as living with friends or occupy-
ing more cramped quarters. In contrast to
Hungary, Western European countries nor-
mally had a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio around 80
percent as of the year 2000. By allowing the
buyer to pay for the home over a longer period
of time, housing has been more widely accessi-
ble in Western European countries that offered
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larger loans. But with financing not generally
available and relatively high housing prices in
Hungary, an environment of low affordability
exists. In 2000 a new home cost seven or eight
times the average annual household income in
Hungary while in the rest of the EU this figure
was around three times the annual income.
(“Szechenyi Plan,” p. 49) 
As for the construction industry, it expe-
rienced a marked slowdown during the 1990s
as the demand for new homes fell. According to
EU averages, Hungary should have replaced
about one percent, or roughly 40,000, of all its
homes each year. Instead the country built only
a little more than 28,000 homes each year dur-
ing the 1990s. (Yearbook of Housing Statistics,
p. 23) By neglecting to build new homes, the
number of residences in poor condition grew;
in fact, 55 percent of all homes in the country
required renovation. The hastily constructed
housing projects built during the communist
era were especially in need of renovations and
continued to be a source of concern to their res-
idents. With extremely high ownership rates
dominating the housing market, the stock of
rental housing was small, with rentals repre-
senting only 7 percent of the housing market
(compared to the EU average of around 38 per-
cent). (“Szechenyi Plan,” p. 50) In Hungary,
renters have a strong aversion to renting due
to a fear of rent increases beyond the tenant’s
control. (Hegedus et al., June 2004, p. 13) 
Description of the Szechenyi Plan  
As its economy began to strengthen in the
year 2000, Hungary saw the possibility of EU
accession on the horizon. In order to capitalize
on this possibility, Hungarian lawmakers intro-
duced the Szechenyi Plan. The plan consisted
of six separate programs to deal with specific
issues. The six programs covered the growth of
small and medium-sized businesses, housing,
tourism promotion, encouragement of innova-
tion, expressway development, and regional
development. The housing program received
almost a quarter of the Szechenyi Plan’s bud-
get, which demonstrated the government’s
resolve to strengthen the housing system, even
at great expense. (“Szechenyi Plan,” p. 29)
However, the budget for the housing program
only covered the expenses from 2001 to 2002.
The cost would grow much higher in the com-
ing years.
In order to implement the housing pro-
gram of the Szechenyi Plan, the government
formulated four goals: increasing the housing
supply, modernizing existing homes, modern-
izing the housing loan system, and enlarging
the apartment rental sector. While the
Szechenyi Plan had a specific budget for the
entire housing program, the budget was not
divided among the four goals. Furthermore, in
what turned out to be an extremely expensive
part of the housing program, interest rate sub-
sidies, the plan provided no explicit limits on
income or other criteria that an individual
needed to meet to become a recipient. The
Conservative Party that initiated the Szechenyi
Plan provided only two years of budgetary fig-
ures for the Plan, the amount of time until the
next major election in 20021. In addition to its
desire to increase the quality of housing in the
country, the party also wanted to use the sub-
sidies to generate votes in the 2002 election. If
the party lost power, then creating a plan for
more than two years would be irrelevant. If the
party retained power, it could plan the housing
program for subsequent years at that time.
Implementing the Plan
One of the first things the government
decided was to institute a series of housing
finance subsidies to make housing more afford-
able and accessible. Housing, of course, plays
an important role in most societies due to the
fact it affects both the quality of life and also the
country’s economy. The Hungarian government
hoped to build a significant number of new
homes each year. A new home is a relatively
expensive item since it requires construction
workers, building supplies, furnishings, land-
scaping, etc., which in turn support a large
cross section of the economy. Nevertheless, a
“broken” housing system can also consume a
large quantity of resources. (Hoek-Smit and
Diamond, p. 7) Fixing the underlying problems
1According to conversations while visiting Hungary, the
political party in power has changed every four years since
1990.
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the housing system faces is a far more efficient
use of time, resources, and energy than simply
giving housing subsidies. 
While there are many ways to subsidize
housing finance, Hungary chose three specific
methods. These methods are the demand-side
interest subsidy (DSIS), the supply-side inter-
est subsidy (SSIS), and the personal income tax
deduction (PITD). The DSIS directly provided
home buyers with incentives. By this method,
the government pays a portion of the borrow-
er’s interest payment to the bank. This subsidy
ensured that borrowers would pay a maximum
interest rate of 8 percent (Table 1). Between
January 2000 and December 2003, the maxi-
mum allowable loan was increased from
€31,500 to €44,600. Furthermore, the length of
the subsidy was increased from 10 to 20 years
and the maximum interest rate paid on the loan
decreased from 8 percent to 6 percent. All of
these factors greatly benefited home buyers.
(Hegedus and Somogyi) 
The DSIS was intended to help those who
could not afford high interest rates, especially
the lower class and young families trying to buy
their first home. Unfortunately, this subsidy was
not very efficient. Only a subset of the group
that qualified actually needed the subsidy to
purchase their homes. There were other prob-
lems as well. The subsidy disproportionately
benefited the wealthy — the greater the loan,
the greater the subsidy. By making the subsidy
available only for new housing, it tended to raise
the price of new homes. (Hoek-Smit and
Diamond, p. 11) Finally, it was very easy for the
government to hide the subsidy’s true cost since
all future expenses would appear on future bud-
gets. At the time of the introduction of the
DSIS, it appeared cheap and promised many
benefits to home buyers, all of which courted
favor towards the Conservative Party. 
Initially only first time home buyers who
purchased new homes were eligible to receive
the DSIS. This gave the subsidy to those who
needed it most. But in June 2000, anyone pur-
chasing a new home also now qualified for the
subsidy. And as Hungarian lawmakers contin-
ued to be swayed by political pressure, they
finally granted the subsidy to anyone renovat-
ing their home and to private developers as
well. (Hegedus and Somogyi, p. 4) In addition
to helping the construction and banking indus-
tries, the widening eligibility criteria for the
DSIS served as a “present” for the general pub-
lic of Hungary. And its true purpose became not
just to increase the standard of living, but to
win votes from the people. 
In addition to the DSIS subsidy for bor-
rowers, the government also created the sup-
ply-side interest subsidy (SSIS) for banks that
borrowed money. By allowing the banks to bor-
row money at a lower interest rate, banks could
then lend money to home buyers at a lower
interest rate. The SSIS was based on the
Table 1
Demand-Side Interest Rate Subsidies: 2000–2003
January June June October June December 
2000 2000 2001 2001 2003 2003
Maximum loan 8 10 10 10 15 15
(million HUF)
Term of Subsidy 10 years 10 years 20 years 20 years 20 years 20 years
All new All new All new All new
First time All buyers home home home home
Eligibility buyers of of new buyers and buyers and buyers and buyers and
new homes homes renovation renovation renovation renovation
loans loans loans loans
Maximum Interest 8% 8% 8% 6% 6% Variable
Paid on Loan
Source: Hegedus and Somogyi, “Failure or Success of the Mortgage Subsidy Program in 2000–2004 in Hungary?” p. 8.
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assumption that the banks would pass on the
cost savings generated by the subsidy to the
borrower. During the initial implementation of
the SSIS in 2000, the subsidy ensured that
banks would make a return of 4.5 percent on
their loans. As time progressed, however, lob-
bying groups pressured the government into
increasing the level of the SSIS. (Hegedus and
Somogyi, p. 3) As a result, in June 2001 the
bank subsidy became more generous; and in
October of that year the government allowed
banks to borrow money at zero percent inter-
est. Incredibly, in February 2002 yet another
change to the SSIS meant that banks could bor-
row money at 9 percent and receive a 10 per-
cent subsidy from the government. In other
words, the banks could profit simply by bor-
rowing!
The third method that Hungary chose to
subsidize housing finance was by a generous
personal income tax deduction (PITD) for mort-
gage payments. Using this subsidy, individuals
could deduct the interest paid on a housing loan
from their income tax obligations. Before 2000,
individuals could deduct up to 20 percent of
their interest payment with a maximum deduc-
tion of €135 per year. In 2001 lawmakers
increased the deduction to 40 percent of the
interest payment subject to a maximum of €800
for those who purchased a new home. (Hegedus
and Somogyi, p. 4) All in all, the PITD encour-
aged the use of the mortgage finance system by
making a mortgage more affordable, and it also
helped the middle class purchase a home.
However, the PITD wound up doing a very poor
job; for all homeowners received the subsidy
while relatively few new buyers eventually pur-
chased homes. This tax deduction also provid-
ed very little benefit to the lower class, since
most in this class rent and pay little income tax. 
In 2002 the Socialist Party won the elec-
tions and displaced the Conservative Party,
which had been in power for the previous four
years. In their campaign, the socialists
promised to maintain the current housing sub-
sidies and even hinted at the possibility of
increasing some of them. The government ini-
tially kept its promise, but then in June 2003 it
reduced the benefits of the housing subsidy pro-
gram. Although the first decrease proved to be
far milder than expected, in December 2003 the
government dramatically cut the housing sub-
sidy program to keep the budget deficit down.
The result was that at the end of 2003, borrow-
ers took out a record number of new housing
loans before the removal of the generous sub-
sidies. (“Report from…,” p. 7) 
Effects of the Plan
The legacy of the Szechenyi Plan for
Hungary was mixed. In some respects the plan
met its goals and in other respects did little of
what it set out to achieve. On the positive side,
the number of home loans increased. The plan
also met its goal for increasing the number of
new homes constructed, while homes on aver-
age became more affordable. Finally, competi-
tion among lending institutions increased, and
the number of bank branches and real estate
offices grew. On the negative side, the plan pro-
duced large budget deficits. Also a dispropor-
tionate amount of the subsidies went to the
wealthy, and the market share of rental hous-
ing remained flat. In the next few sections I dis-
cuss each of the above in more detail.
Positive Accomplishments
Turning first to the benefits of the hous-
ing program, the plan certainly increased the
volume of housing loans. Before the plan was
put in place, in 2000 there were €511 million
in existing housing loans compared to a total
of €3.36 billion at the end of 2003.2 This
increased the loan ratio from 2 percent of GDP
in 2001 to 9 percent of GDP at the end of 2003.
(“Hungary…,” p. 14) The fact is that there were
very few existing loans in 2000; most of the
housing loans from the communist era had
been repaid by that point. 
Hungary also rapidly expanded its new
home construction in line with the Szechenyi
Plan’s goal. According to the Hungarian Central
Statistics Office (HCSO), the country had never
produced more than 40,000 new homes in a
year until 2004. While the country reached the
home construction goal a year later than orig-
inally planned, the country continued to meet
2All figures given are in real euro terms (2000).
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the 40,000 home goal in 2005. (GKI Economic
Research Co.) Homebuilding provides the econ-
omy with a sustainable source of economic
activity and will continue to increase the qual-
ity of life in Hungary as homeowners replace
older homes.
During the period 2000–2003, interest rates
dropped while incomes grew. This combination
of factors moderately raised housing prices, but
housing actually became more affordable.
(“Remarks from…,” p. 3) Housing affordability
can be measured using the average-house-price-
to-annual-income ratio, a ratio that measures
the number of years it would take for the aver-
age person to buy the median priced home.
(Hegedus and Somogyi, p. 11) In 2000 it cost the
average person between seven and eight years of
income for a new home, while this figure
dropped to about six years of income in 2003. 
While housing did become more afford-
able when compared to the average income, the
situation did not improve in terms of how much
a person could borrow. Before the Szechenyi
Plan, the average borrower could take out a
loan for only around 15–20 percent of the
home’s selling price. Also, foreclosure laws
changed in 2001 to allow lenders to recover
their money more quickly and therefore
exposed them to less risk. About this time, the
market also became more active, which enabled
lenders who foreclosed on a property to realize
a higher liquidation value. 
With the revised foreclosure laws and
increased market liquidity, along with greater
competition among lending institutions, bor-
rowers now had the ability to take out a loan of
50 percent of the home’s value as of the end of
2003. (Rozsavolgyi and Kovacs, p. 4) While this
represented a significant improvement over the
prior more restrictive lending practices, it
remained a long way from the original goal of
reaching the European average of making loans
available for up to 80 percent of the home’s
value. For a young couple looking to purchase
their first home in Hungary, the large 
down payment required could create a signifi-
cant problem. In November 2005, the average
price of a home in Budapest was €77,300.
(Ingatlan…) With average yearly income
roughly €6,000, the €38,650 that a new home
buyer had to give as a down payment present-
ed an enormous obstacle for many. (“Thousands
Celebrate…”)
The plan did have the effect of making
Hungary’s housing infrastructure stronger. The
increased level of development and competition
among financial institutions for housing loans
has benefited the consumer. Before 2000, the
communist-era state bank, OTP, had 90 percent
of the housing finance market; but after the
start of the subsidy system OTP’s share dropped
to two-thirds. (Hegedus and Somogyi, p. 6) The
growth of the housing industry has also led to
more opportunities for real estate agents. Duna
House, currently Hungary’s largest real estate
franchise network, grew from only three offices
in spring 2003 to 45 offices in early 2006. (Duna
House Co.) The growth of a national franchise
network like this provides a level of uniformity
to the real estate business around the country
and eases the problems of moving. During the
period 1991–1999, 87.9 percent of homes were
built by individuals and their friends and fami-
ly. By the end of 2004, only 60.3 percent of
homes were built by the individual and their
friends and family as housing developers had
taken on a much greater role in home building.
(Yearbook of Housing Statistics, p. 28) This
marked progress towards a more efficient build-
ing system that utilizes economies of scale.
Individuals could now obtain a higher quality
home for a lower price. 
Failures
The Hungarian housing sector experi-
enced many positive changes from the
Szechenyi Plan, but the changes were not cost-
less. The housing subsidy plan severely strained
the government budget. From the start of the
program in 2000 the government spent more
than it had expected. In 2001, the government
spent more than twice the amount on subsidies
than it had budgeted; and by 2003 it had spent
five times the amount on subsidies that it had
spent two years earlier. While the primary
intent of the Szechenyi Plan was to encourage
building and to help first-time home buyers, the
government supplied 50 percent more subsidy
funds for the purchase of used homes than it
did for the construction or purchase of new
homes. (Yearbook of Housing Statistics, p. 37)
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Although Hungarians constructed and
bought many new homes during this period,
the average size of homes diminished with each
year. One- and two-bedroom apartments also
saw their average floor size decrease (by 16 per-
cent), although the size of larger units
remained roughly flat. (Yearbook of Housing
Statistics, p. 31) These data suggest that per-
haps those who could not afford a new home in
the past could now afford to purchase a small-
er unit. An overabundance of new small homes
could pose a problem in the future; for when
current occupants want to find a larger home,
they may encounter a market saturated with
small units. 
If the government had hoped to make
housing more affordable for the middle and
lower classes, then it should have allocated
more funds to these buyers. Unfortunately, the
demand side interest rate subsidy (DSIS) and
the personal income tax deduction (PITD) were
not up to the task. Those buyers with higher
incomes and who spent more on a home
received more of the subsidies. The personal
income tax deduction provides a rough indica-
tion as to which segments of society received
the greatest portion of housing subsidies. In
2003, those in the upper 20 percent of the
income bracket received 60 percent of the per-
sonal income tax deduction. (Hegedus and
Somogyi, p. 5)
In addition to trying to increase the avail-
ability and affordability of new homes, the gov-
ernment also attempted to move the proportion
of housing units that are rentals closer to the
EU level of 38 percent. Unfortunately, the plan
achieved very little progress in meeting this
goal. The share of rental housing held flat at 
7 percent throughout the period 2000–2003
despite the government’s efforts. (“Housing
Statistics…,” p. 50) At the end of 2003, Hungary
was on the verge of joining the EU. As this
would open Hungary’s economy to the other EU
members, a shortage of rental housing units
impedes the geographic mobility of workers
throughout the country.
Recommendations
With Hungary’s integration into the EU,
it now has access to Europe’s capital markets.
The possible entrance into the Eurozone in
20123 will bring significant changes to the
structure of the country’s housing finance sys-
tem by bringing about sustainably low interest
rates. This will probably then make housing
subsidies a thing of the past. In the meantime,
though, Hungary will need to deal with its cur-
rent housing finance issues. In order to con-
tinue the growth of the housing market, one of
two things must happen: either the government
should provide an upfront subsidy to home buy-
ers or it should find a way to increase the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio. 
With the current LTV ratio hovering
around 50 percent, a tremendous burden is
placed on first-time home buyers who are
required to come up with large down payments.
Even with the government subsidizing interest
rates on mortgages, many buyers will still have
to struggle to make the down payment. The
government should provide qualified home
buyers with the present-value lump sum equiv-
alent to any future interest rate subsidies. For
example, instead of giving subsidies on each
interest payment in the future, the government
can estimate the value of those subsidies and
give them to the home buyer at the time of pur-
chase. This would greatly ease the problem of
coming up with the down payment. Chile suc-
cessfully developed such a program that pro-
vided grants to low-income households looking
to purchase a new home. (Hoek-Smit and
Diamond, p. 34) The up-front subsidy would
greatly ease the initial burden and if done cor-
rectly would not cost the state any more than
if it were to offer a DSIS or a personal income
tax deduction.
Similarly, the government needs to con-
tinue making structural reforms in order to
increase the LTV ratio of a newly purchased
home. One reform might be the creation of a
centralized third party credit information sys-
tem that extends beyond the proprietary infor-
mation that each lending institution has about
a customer. The more information a creditor
3In order to join the European Monetary Union (EMU)
and adopt the euro, the country needs to meet the
Maastricht criteria. This includes meeting conditions on the
country’s inflation rate, current account deficit, long term
debt, exchange rate, and long term interest rates.
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has about a loan applicant’s history, the more
confident the creditor will be when making 
a loan. Additionally, the state might consider
guaranteeing loans. This would encourage
banks to lend more. With the government
guaranteeing loans, the market would become
more liquid and make it easier for a bank 
to sell a foreclosed property in the event 
of default. This in turn means that the 
bank is taking on less risk and can lend 
more. This cycle benefits both the bank and
borrower.
Regardless of which course Hungary
chooses for the next several years, it needs to
avoid regressive subsidy programs of the 
types it has put in place. By offering the 
upper-income class subsidized rates on their
homes and large income tax deductions, 
the country is allocating a disproportionate
amount of its revenues to relatively few home
buyers.
Conclusion
Overall, the subsidy system in Hungary
from 2000–2003 achieved a very modest degree
of success. The number of new homes built each
year increased beyond the Szechenyi Plan’s tar-
get goal. However, the unchanged supply of
rental units and a consistently low loan-to-value
ratio has continued to make a home unafford-
able for many. As the subsidy system expanded
from late 2000 to the end of 2003, it included
more members of society and became less tar-
geted at new home buyers and the lower class.
The government should institute more effective
policies, such as a third party credit information
system, and should provide up-front lump-sum
subsidies. In any case, as Hungary moves closer
to meeting the Maastricht criteria and adopting
the euro, interest rates should fall and make
many of the subsidies discussed in this article
much less important to the housing market.
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